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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the notion of embodiment in robot 
technologies for eldercare, drawing on the phenomenology of the body and 
discussions of practical nursing ethics. Reaching beyond dualistic discourse 
on aging bodies, we aim to develop a new ethical framework in which lived 
bodies and embodied care practices play a dominant role in interpreting 
moral values of human care. Developing further the notion of “materialising 
morality”, we approach robotcare as an embodied care practice that takes 
place in the  “triangle” between caregivers, care receivers and robotics. 
Taking seriously the idea that touching is crucial for the wellbeing of elderly 
people, this paper comes to the conclusion that robots can take care of 
elderly patients, but they can’t care about them. Robots are not 
replacements for caregivers, but they might be designed to help caregivers 
and clients find more profound embodied interactions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Care practices have the potential either to preserve dignity and identity of 
the elderly or to rob them of a fundamental aspect of their humanity and 
human rights. Economic pressures keep nursing staff ratios low in elderly 
care, which has raised concern about the elderly’s quality of life (Sherwin and 
Meghan). Nursing staff do not have enough time to engage in basic bodily 
care (toileting, dressing, feeding, bathing, etc.), yet better quality interactions 
between the elderly people and caregivers is also needed. Robotics has been 
seen as one plausible solution to this emerging dilemma (Coeckelbergh; 
Sharkey), although a number of scholars have expressed concern about using 
robots for elder care (Sparrow and Sparrow; Sharkey and Sharkey; Turkle). If 
robotics does automate some mundane tasks in human care, it is necessary to 
consider how to arrange mediating interdependencies within care 
relationships. Even if caregiving were done only partially by automatically 
functioning robots, robotics would fundamentally re-embody relations 
between caregivers and care receivers and nurses’ care practices in elderly 
care.  
 
In this paper, our purpose is to investigate embodied interaction in robot 
technologies for eldercare. Our discussion is contextualised within elderly 
people suffering from dementia and how their care needs are related to 
receiving human touch and being seen. We propose that tactile–kinaesthetic 
sensations can simulate and transmit primary feelings of affection, delight, 
safety and pleasure in human care, as much as insecurity, dejection, 
humiliation and embarrassment. Recent ethical debates on personhood have 
focussed attention on the needs of vulnerable, elderly individuals and their 
dignity and autonomy (Hughes et al.). Illuminating the problems within 
dualistic discourses on elderly people, we show how such discourses display a 
lack of understanding of how embodiment and intercorporeality are 
inherently connected to personhood.  
 
Our theoretical approach is largely drawn from Husserl’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological notions of the lived body. In trying to contribute 
to the conceptualisation of ‘roboethics’, we consider that a pressing need 
exists to develop an ethically satisfactory discussion of elderly care in the 
context of nursing practice (see, e.g., Benner; Kittay and Feder; Tronto). 
This is a necessary step towards a roboethics that takes seriously the issues of 
embodiment and embodied practices in robotcare. Reaching beyond a 
dualistic discourse of aging bodies, we aim to evolve an ethical framework in 
which lived bodies and embodied care practices play a dominant role in 
interpreting the moral values of human care. 
 
We approach robotcare as an embodied practice that takes place in the 
“triangle” between caregivers, care receivers and robotics. Many researchers 
have categorised three main types of service robots in eldercare: monitoring 
robots that help observe behaviour and health, assistive robots that support the 
elderly and/or their caretakers in daily tasks and social robots that provide 
companionship (e.g., Sharkey and Sharkey). To understand how nursing 
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tasks incorporate the use of care robotics, we focus on assistive robotics, 
especially interactive body assistance. Assistive robotics include, for instance, 
automatic feeding robots, bathtub robots and robots that can pick up and 
carry humans from a bed to a wheelchair.  
 
This paper begins by outlining why the mind–body dichotomy is relevant to 
eldercare. We are interested in references made to “bodies” in the context of 
aging, since it is a complex multifaceted concept that defies simple definition. 
Following this, we introduce the notion of agency and a phenomenological 
framework for understanding embodiment. From this, we present a 
phenomenological framework for the evaluation of service robots and provide 
an example to illustrate its utility. In so doing, we explore how ethical 
discussions of human dignity have ignored questions of the embodied subject. 
Let us now pay particular attention to the ways embodiment disappears 
behind theoretical models of human rights. 
 
 
2. Dualistic discourses on aging bodies 
 
We are especially interested in the profound ambivalence toward 
embodiment in discourses on elderly people and their care. In these ethical 
discourses (e.g., Fenton and Mitchell; Sharkey and Sharkey; Schuzl et al.), 
embodiment is generally detached from other “dimensions” of the self, 
whether they are called mental, cognitive, psychological, social, spiritual, 
emotional or affective. This ambivalence broadly informs the categories that 
split older persons into physical, psychological and social dimensions. For 
instance, according to Sharkey and Sharkey “It seems reasonable to assume 
that there is shared human concern about the physical and psychological 
welfare of the elderly” (28). This dualistic notion of the body as a legacy of 
Cartesian dualism has long inspired anxiety. As Anker suggests, such 
assumptions about mind–body dualism easily permeate discussions of moral 
ethics and human rights. For instance, the concept of bodily integrity 
emphasises the importance of personal autonomy and self-determination over 
one’s own physical body (Nussbaum). Having been developed as an approach 
to global development and justice, the conceptualisation of human rights 
remains in a dualistic trap strongly emphasising the difference between the 
physical and psychological dimensions of human existence. 
 
Bodily integrity has thereby become a predicate to human dignity, emphasising 
the liberal subject that must actively possess autonomous and self-enclosed 
embodiment (e.g., Nussbaum). While the notion of the physical body offers 
important baselines that lend force to many invaluable human rights 
protections, it nevertheless marshals a highly abstract, disembodied, idealised 
and anaemic vision of human selfhood. Anker proposes that the notion of the 
physical body is inadequate to prescribe how embodied subjects share their 
lives and intimacy with other living beings. This idealised body, moreover, 
finds an important corollary in a construct of the body that is both an 
independent and disconnected entity. Both the myth of the integrity of the 
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natural human body and the different “dimensions” of the human being are 
paradoxically consolidated by the spectre of nuclear and discrete bodies.  
 
In gerontological research, the notion of the idealised body has, at least 
implicitly, been incorporated into the perception that the declining body 
constitutes the ontology of ageing (e.g., Tulle). Kittay and Feder argue that 
the emphasis on bodily ageing has resulted in a medical model that locates 
the source of disability in the individual and suggests that the individual is 
defective and needs fixing, although many times it is the social situation with 
which we should be concerned. However, biological and medical perceptions 
on aging have also been challenged in gerontological research (Kontos; 
Wainwright and Turner). Kontos proposes, “The body itself is an active, 
communicative agent, imbued with its own wisdom, intentionality, and 
purposefulness” (558). Kontos’s perception erases the mind–body split in a 
way that allows people with dementia to preserve agency. There are aspects 
of the lived body, such as being touched by others or being seen by others, 
that seem to be especially important to the wellbeing of older people 
(Routasalo and Isola). However, the right to be touched (non-sexually) by 
others is not explicitly addressed by human rights principles or moral ethics. 
While bodily integrity is mentioned frequently in reports on dignity, because of 
dualistic discourses, the right to be touched by others has been difficult to 
discuss in elderly care. 
 
It is easy to slip into a dualistic framework when discussing issues of bodily 
integrity or bodily health, setting the physical/material body in opposition to 
either the mind or the self. When it comes to sensations and experience, 
phenomenological analytical methods can provide appropriate conceptual 
tools to identify the embodied subject and agent connected to other living 
bodies. Phenomenological research on interactive design during the past two 
decades has shown the potential value of understanding the role of tactile–
kinaesthetic sensations in human–computer interactions (Parviainen et al.). 
This value, we argue, gives rise to considerations that must be weighed 
alongside the likely impact of the development of service robots and shared, 
embodied communications between people through touch, hearing and 
seeing. As Kittay proposes, being a person means having the capacity to 
develop and sustain contact with other persons, to shape one’s own world 
and the world of others and to have a life that another person can conceive of 
as an imaginative possibility (568). According to Turkle, our willingness to 
involve robots in the care of people with dementia may be explained by the 
fact that we do not recognise people with dementia as persons and robots as 
machines since both the demented and robots are incapable of putting 
themselves in the place of others (108). 
 
 
3. The phenomenology of lived body and agency 
 
In an effort to move beyond this dualism, phenomenological theories of 
embodiment have emphasised the mental impact of bodily activities by using 
the terms “embodied self” and “embodied mind” (e.g., Varela et al.). 
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Merleau-Ponty famously speaks of the ambiguous nature of the body and 
argues that bodily existence is a “third category” beyond the merely 
physiological and psychological (Gallagher and Zahavi 153). This third 
category, the lived body, is neither spirit nor nature, neither soul nor body, 
neither inner nor outer. All of these counter-posed categories are derivations 
of something more basic. Phenomenologists deny that the body is a mere 
object, but the body can take itself as an object of exploration.  
 
In trying to clarify the notion of the lived body, Husserl made a 
phenomenological distinction between the physical body (Körper) and the 
lived body (Leib) (107). Whereas the notion of Leib captures the body as the 
embodied first-person perspective, the Körper is an objectified, corporeal, 
material entity. The body as Körper is seen from an observer’s point of view, 
where the observer may be a scientist, a physician or the embodied subject 
himself/herself (Gallagher and Zahavi 154). Seemingly, public health 
discourses mainly focus on the physical body (Körper), consisting of bones, 
neural pathways, circulation, etc. For instance, fitness programs recommend 
that ageing people increase muscle strength, preserve bone density and 
improve balance because adults over 50 can lose around a half a pound of 
muscle mass every year. This discourse on the body is inherently dualistic, 
ignoring the notion of the lived body by focusing on the body as a mere 
material entity.  
 
As stated above, phenomenologists consider that the lived body cannot be 
treated as a mere material object located in space. Therefore, lived bodies are 
not delineated by skin, as are our physical and material bodies. This is the 
point where the notion of bodily integrity becomes problematic since it does 
not necessarily consider the relevancy of the intimate space that is part of the 
lived body. Internal bodily sensations can be as intense as what people feel 
when their intimate space is invaded – feeling the presence as oppressive, 
freeing or inspiring. In the same way, touching the skin can be felt as pleasant 
or unpleasant, depending on the feelings in the intimate space. Touching is 
much more than physical contact between bodies; it can include various 
affective atmospheres such as an icy atmosphere when we feel chilly, an 
uncanny situation that makes our hair stand on end or a tense interpersonal 
climate that is felt as oppressive or suffocating (Fuchs 616). Touching has 
been found to be crucial for the wellbeing of elderly people (Bush). However, 
the importance of touching for elderly people is usually explained only in 
physiological terms, such as how touching can release the hormone oxytocin 
(Uvnäs-Moberg). Oxytocin is seen to have a potential physiological anti-
stress effect by decreasing blood pressure and cortisol levels.   
 
We assume that clarifying the notion of the lived body will allow for a more 
profound understanding of the agency of elderly people in the nurse–client 
relationship. The lived body is the agent that acts based on feelings and 
sensations of the body and affordances and restrictions produced by the 
environment. Despite the erosion their capacities for memory, people with 
dementia have an embodied way of “being-in-the-world”. It is important to 
see that, here, acting is more than just reacting to stimulus. Applying recent 
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theories of dementia, people with dementia provide a reflective response to 
situations, though their actions might be seen inappropriate and incorrect. 
Although most people with dementia undergo behavioural changes during the 
course of the disease, they have usually creative potential based on the 
circumstances of action (Joas). Reed-Danahay has challenged researchers to 
think of behaviours by people with dementia as reasonable responses to the 
environment rather than as pathological traits. 
 
Despite the erosion of their memory capacities and other cognitive abilities, 
people who suffer from dementia still have the capability to communicate 
through gestures and touching. According to Langland and Panicussi, the 
more confused elderly people are, the more touch deprived they become. 
When gestures and touch are involved in communication, even the confused 
can usually understand different feelings and affects and experience pleasure 
or displeasure within care practices (Bush). Being treated as mere physical 
things by caregivers prevents them from communicating through lived bodies, 
increasing their sense of vulnerability. By ignoring their privacy needs and 
showing a lack of respect for their Leib, the elderly can be perceived as no 
more than physical things to be moved and fed. This may result in the elderly 
perceiving care as something that is done to them rather than done through 
mutual participation.  
 
In developing practical nursing ethics in the context of service robots, we 
turn to Patricia Benner’s seven moral sources and skills. Benner (7) suggests 
that nurses should 1) have relational skills in meeting older people in their 
particularity, 2) be able to recognise when a moral principle such as injustice 
is at stake, 3) have skilled know-how that allows for ethical comportment 
and action in particular encounters in a timely manner, 4) have moral 
deliberation and communication skills that allow for justification of and 
experiential learning about actions and decisions, 5) have an understanding of 
the goals and ends of good nursing practice, 6) participate in a community of 
practitioners that allows for character development and 7) have the capacity 
to love themselves and their neighbours and have the capacity to be loved. 
Interpreting Benner’s list, it seems that the phenomenological notion of the 
lived body can be useful in several ways in understanding the role of 
interaction and communication skills in the context of care robots.  
 
 
4. Human-robot interaction and materialised morality 
 
Sharkey and Sharkey raise two main ethical concerns about the use of 
assistive robotcare for the elderly and its effects on their welfare: it might 
reduce the amount of human contact that the elderly have, and if used 
insensitively, it could increase the elderly’s feelings of objectification and a 
lack of control over their lives (29). From a phenomenological perspective, 
we identify “objectification” as treating people as mere physical objects to be 
pushed, lifted, pumped or drained without proper reference to their lived 
bodies. For example, when a nurse showers a resident in a nursing home, the 
resident feels the temperature of the air and water on her skin as well as the 
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force the nurse uses while wiping her skin. The resident may sense the mood 
of the nurse and her attitude towards the task and the resident. The nurse 
can “read” the resident’s experiences from her gestures, postures and looks. 
The nurse may detect from a little tremble that the resident is not calm and 
adjust her actions. Also, the nurse experiences her own responses in the 
situation. The lived body binds us to a relational interplay through which we 
face the other body’s feelings and sensations, and at least for now, this goes 
far beyond what a robot can perceive. A robot might measure a resident’s 
skin temperature and pulse and react to these, but it cannot comprehend the 
overall situation from the resident’s viewpoint. 
 
The bathing example shows that nurses are capable of embodied practical 
wisdom, but this does not mean that all nurses are sensitive about the lived 
bodies of residents. Caregivers with or without assistive robots can take care 
of physical bodies but ignore the lived bodies of clients, leading to reduced 
contact and increased objectification. However, in feeding, bathing, lifting or 
moving, robots can only monitor, feed and support physical bodies; they 
cannot take care of lived bodies. The worry is that the use of robots in elder 
care for tasks such as lifting, carrying or even cleaning might reduce the 
amount of human social contact that an elderly person experiences. 
 
The embodied-care tasks for which the care robot will be used play a 
dominant role in the prioritisation and interpretation of values/moral 
elements in care. Once the robot enters a network, it will alter the 
distribution of responsibilities and roles within the network, as well as the 
manner in which the practice takes place. Verbeek refers to this hybrid 
between humans and technologies as a transforming mode. When 
technologies are used, they shape human actions and perceptions, creating 
new practices and ways of living. Verbeek argues that engineers “materialise 
morality” (369). For that reason, as van Wynsberghe puts it, a roboethic 
should address the shift in responsibilities that occurs after robots have been 
included in a socio-technical network, such as integrating them into care 
practices in hospitals and care homes.  
 
Medical technologies have often been considered extensions of the nurse’s 
body, but in the context of service robotics, the robot can be seen as a 
technological medium between the nurse and the client. Van Wynsberghe 
suggests that the nurse’s role is to incorporate the use of technology in a 
variety of ways, from the mechanical bed to heart monitoring devices. 
However, technological media can alienate nurses from embodied resonance 
and awareness in felt contact with clients, when new technologies re-shape 
skills in nursing practice. In this understanding, the presence of the technology 
might decrease their use of social-emotional skills. We assume that the 
phenomenological approach within the lived body could open up a more 
positive perspective on materialising morality. If the designers of assisting 
robots can take into account the needs of lived bodies in “smart” 
technological solutions, nurses could embody caring practices within robotics 
without losing their expertise and abilities in using relational skills. This 
process might empower nursing practice and advocacy for those who are 
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vulnerable.  
 
We assume that the phenomenological attitude in designing robotics is 
possible; it is too early to say whether it is likely. By using assistive “smart” 
robotics for lifting, carrying and even cleaning, nurses and caregivers could 
focus on embodied social interactions with their clients while robotics do the 
labour. While the robot takes care of the hard physical work, the nurse can 
touch the client, supporting her/his movements during the lifting or carrying 
operation. These types of embodied social contacts could have a positive 
influence on the wellbeing of aging people. When using autonomous assistant 
robots in home settings or in care homes, it is necessary to understand that 
robots can take care of some actions, but they are unable to care (Turkle). 
Some aspects of human nursing care may be regimented and scripted into 
machine-like performances that are suitable for robots, but transmitting 
affective touch within movements is not one of them. 
 
 
5. Care triangle  
 
As we have stressed throughout the paper, from a phenomenological 
perspective, care ethics is closely connected to good care practice and 
embodied practical wisdom in human care. The design of autonomous robots 
in home settings or in care homes is usually based on a vision of a task rather 
than a practice (Turkle). In terms of this narrow notion of care, lifting is just 
an action that needs to be done to move to the next action. The value of 
efficiency is the top priority. Autonomous robots can be designed for simple 
tasks, but they cannot replace embodied practices in socially complex 
environments. Turkle and van Wynsberghe claim that embodied practices in 
human care always require a reciprocal interaction between the care-receiver 
and caregiver. Instead of focusing merely on the nurse–patient relationship, 
we assume that an ethical evaluation of care robots is needed to identify the 
third part of the interaction: robotics. 
 
We call our approach to using assistive robotics a “care triangle”, which 
captures the idea of “human-robot-human interaction”.  The notion of a care 
triangle identifies the different roles of the caregiver, care receiver and robot 
in care praxis. In the middle of this care triangle there are embodied practices 
such as lifting, bathing, feeding, fetching items and delivering 
medications/food/sheets to the room or to the nurse, as well as personal 
communication, social interaction, and games and activities such as singing 
songs or painting. In clarifying the understanding of embodied care practices, 
we use as an example assistive robots used to lift and move people. When a 
resident is lifted by a nurse, this is one of the more vulnerable moments for 
the client. The client trusts the nurse, and through this action a bond is 
formed and/or strengthened that reinforces the relationship between the 
client and the nurse. As with the example of bathing, the significance of this 
action is found not in its physical movements but in its relational interplay 
between the lived bodies. Lifting a client requires the attentiveness of a nurse 
determining when and to what degree touch is necessary (van Wynsberghe 
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417).  
 
Assistive robotics should not decrease possibilities for affective touch but, on 
the contrary, offer more significant focus on embodied praxis and how it 
“materialises morality”. When technologies are implemented for lifting tasks, 
this can have the effect of reducing the clients’ self-respect or making them 
feel humiliated. Increased use of assistive robots, in general, could lead to a 
reduced number of human interactions, but it also could increase older 
people’s opportunities for social interaction and affiliation with others. The 
reason for this has to do with understanding how embodied practices of 
human care are manifested in robot–human interactions. This also means 
that the robot is not designed to replace the human completely and is 
evaluated for how it enables humans in the performance of their practice. 
Facial expressions, tones of voice, gestures and postures allow persons to read 
one another’s responses and feelings and should also be a major component 
of ethics in the care triangle.  
 
As mentioned above, the touch involved in care practices transmits complex 
information about emotions and affects, creating a value-laden milieu 
(Turkle). In the context of the care triangle, robotics is characterised as an 
interpersonal intervention that can develop a partnership and reciprocity in 
the nurse–client relationship. Benner emphasises that the nursing praxis is 
concerned with nurturing insightful, helping relationships that depend on 
meeting the particular “other” in particular contexts (13). The moral 
judgment of nurses is inherently part of everyday care and embodied contact 
with clients. Taking into account the capacities of the client and the 
situation, nurses have to make practical judgments about the clients’ needs 
while respecting their autonomy. In Benner’s words, “nurses are the patient’s 
front line of defence, and therefore must be knowledgeable and have 
character traits of assertiveness and openness, suited for critical thinking, 
effective patient advocacy, and for ongoing experimental learning” (13). 
Regarding the design of care robots, coproduction and experimental learning 
by nurses and clients, reflecting on their lived body, are highly important. To 
gain a new level of robotics requires ensuring that the perspective of lived 
body is taken seriously. 
 
The notion of a care triangle captures the idea that robots are not a 
replacement for caregivers, but when they are designed to assist labour tasks 
including lifting and carrying, they can help nurses and clients achieve more 
profound, embodied interaction. Such robots could make elderly people feel 
that they have more relational autonomy in care practices. Relational 
approaches to autonomy grant that individuals’ actions are inevitably linked 
to the affordances of the agent’s environment (Christman). Even if people 
with dementia are highly dependent on human nursing care, they might 
benefit a great deal from relationships through their lived bodies, since they 
are unable to use cognitive coping strategies to adjust to age-based changes in 
functional abilities (Pirhonen and Pietilä). 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Philosophical and empirical research that divides body and mind is not 
enough to provide a clear picture of how the elderly encounter robots and 
the effect of this interaction on their everyday lives. In this paper, we have 
suggested that a phenomenological approach is needed to understand 
embodied interaction between older people and robotics. The contribution 
of the present paper lies in its identification of the role of the lived body 
within the context and ethics of using robots in eldercare. In this research 
area, few previous studies have raised similar ethical concerns regarding 
embodiment or focused on the development of eldercare robots.  
 
Identifying the significance of embodiment in ethical concerns associated 
with the use of robots in eldercare is a necessary first step toward ensuring 
that ethical discussions appreciate senior persons’ lived bodies rather than 
merely discuss their physical healthcare or psychological conditions. More 
research is needed to examine how service robots will change nurses’ working 
conditions and their care for the elderly. However, for now, we come to the 
conclusion that robots need not have a negative effect on dignity; instead, 
they can promote social relations and help caregivers and clients find a more 
profound, embodied connection. 
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